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Security and privacy modelsThe world is experiencing an evolution of Smart Cities. These emerge from innovations in
information technology that, while they create new economic and social opportunities, pose
challenges to our security and expectations of privacy. Humans are already interconnected
via smart phones and gadgets. Smart energy meters, security devices and smart appliances
are being used in many cities. Homes, cars, public venues and other social systems are now
on their path to the full connectivity known as the ‘‘Internet of Things.’’ Standards are evolving
for all of these potentially connected systems. They will lead to unprecedented improvements in
the quality of life. To beneﬁt from them, city infrastructures and services are changing with new
interconnected systems for monitoring, control and automation. Intelligent transportation,
public and private, will access a web of interconnected data from GPS location to weather
and trafﬁc updates. Integrated systems will aid public safety, emergency responders and in
disaster recovery. We examine two important and entangled challenges: security and privacy.
Security includes illegal access to information and attacks causing physical disruptions in service
availability. As digital citizens are more and more instrumented with data available about their
location and activities, privacy seems to disappear. Privacy protecting systems that gather data
and trigger emergency response when needed are technological challenges that go hand-in-hand
with the continuous security challenges. Their implementation is essential for a Smart City in
which we would wish to live. We also present a model representing the interactions between
person, servers and things. Those are the major element in the Smart City and their interactions
are what we need to protect.
ª 2014 Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of Cairo University.Introduction
The beneﬁts of Information and Computing Technologies
(ICT) in a Smart City and of the Internet of Things are tremen-
dous. Smart energy meters, security devices, smart appliances
for health and domestic life: these and more offer unprece-
dented conveniences and improved quality of life. City infra-
structures and services are changing with new interconnected
Fig. 2 The production loci of data in the Smart City.
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Fig. 3 Source nodes of activities and services producing data.
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include water and sanitation to emergency responders and
disaster recovery.
These beneﬁts must be considered against the potential
harm that may come from this massively interconnected world.
Technical, administrative and ﬁnancial factors must be
weighted with the legal, political and social environment of
the city.
Methodology
Several paradigms and categorical structures may be applied in
analyzing the beneﬁts and detriments of this data environment.
An applicable paradigm used for this analysis is that of IBM
that the Smart City, its components and its citizens are
 Instrumented
 Interconnected and
 Intelligent.
This is denoted as ‘‘IN3.’’
‘‘Instrumented’’ gives city components and citizens devices,
at varying levels of features that, at a minimum, respond to a
sensor network. These are, in turn, ‘‘interconnected’’ as to pass
information into a network. That information is computation-
ally available for analysis and decision-making, making the
Smart City ‘‘intelligent’’ in its operations.
Security and privacy concerns rest on how the information
within IN3 is used. The core of the technology is the informa-
tion. A full examination of any system of the Smart City may
categorize information as to sources, types, collections, analyt-
ics and use (see Figs. 1–4).
The instrumented source may have particular rights or risks
associated with particular types of information, such as a per-
son’s location or actions. The collections of that information,
such as on the device or on a cloud aggregator, similarly in-
voke issues of rights, duties and risks. From those collections
analytics can build services of varied sophistication which, in
turn may be used for good or ill.
The loci of activity nodes may be categorized in relation to
people, workplace, transportation, homes and social/commer-
cial interactions.
An additional way to categorize within this space is to con-
sider information source nodes as the activities and services of
social and civic life, people, work, home, transport and social
life.
In all of the interactions the information generation and ex-
change is at least bilateral and communicative. Actions oftenFig. 1 Data sources feed data collections feed data analytics for
knowledge.
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Fig. 4 The recursive cycle of data in the Smart City –
information generated is information used is information gener-
ated is information used.
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mation related to the services, including bettering those ser-
vices on analysis.
IN3 is brought together in the commercial culture of
search, recommender services and locational apps for devices
that suggest services based on a person’s location, characteris-
tics and historical preferences.
More fundamental civil services at greater efﬁciency and re-
duced cost are possible for a Smart City. Citizen safety is a par-
amount civil responsibility. After the murder of a social
worker making a home visit, computer engineering students
devised an app package for smartphones that would track
via GPS and provide panic button notiﬁcation to supervisors
and police via direct activation and timed cancelation. This
support was only possible with this instrumented, intercon-
nected and intelligent system. Similarly, every police ofﬁcer
on patrol may be monitored as to his or her precise location
in relation to other activity in the city.
Yet this is subject to abuse. Various apps subvert the instru-
ment, such as a smartphone, and turn it into a spy and track-
ing device for a jealous spouse, obsessed former associate or
malicious voyeur.
The ﬁrst major instrumented/interconnected/intelligent case
before the U.S. Supreme Court involved a GPS tracking de-
vice. The Supreme Court of the United States found the place-
ment and monitoring of a GPS tracking device on a person’s
automobile while it travelled on public roads to be illegal ab-
sent sufﬁcient evidence relating the vehicle to criminal activity
as determined by a neutral magistrate [1]. This was an ‘‘unrea-
sonable search’’ even though it would have been completely
permissible for police agents to follow the automobile in their
own vehicle and log the movements.
Although a prevailing rationale was that the placement
of the tracking device without permission was a trespass,
Associate Justice Sonia Sotomayor in a concurring opinion
addressed the growing risks pervasive computing and
communications technologies, such as GPS-enabled smart-
phone presented for traditional notions of privacy. Electronic
surveillance may still be improper ‘‘when the government
violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society
recognizes as reasonable’’ [2] and she agreed with Justice Alito
that long-term GPS monitoring would impinge on those
expectations.
But Justice Sotomayor continued in United States v. Jones,:
In cases involving even short-term monitoring, . . .GPS
monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a
person’s public movements that reﬂects a wealth of detail
about her familial, political, professional, religious, and
sexual associations . . . (‘‘Disclosed in [GPS] data . . .will be
trips the indisputably private nature of which takes little
imagination to conjure: trips to the psychiatrist, the plastic
surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS treatment center, the
strip club, the criminal defense attorney, the by-the-hour
motel, the union meeting, the mosque, synagogue or
church, the gay bar and on and on’’). The Government
can store such records and efﬁciently mine them for infor-
mation years into the future . . . And because GPS monitor-
ing is cheap in comparison with conventional surveillance
techniques and, by design, proceeds surreptitiously, it
evades the ordinary checks that constrain abusive law
enforcement practices: ‘‘limited police resources andcommunity hostility.’’ Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U. S. 419,
426 (2004).
The knowledge of such surveillance could have a negative
impact on freedoms of speech and association with others as
well as provide the government with immense private informa-
tion subject to misuse.
Security is a global idea tied to safety, an assurance that a
person may go about his or her life without injury to life, prop-
erty or rights. Cyber security is a subset that focuses on com-
puting systems, their data exchange channels and the
information they process, the violations of which may be sanc-
tioned under criminal law [3]. Information security and assur-
ance intertwine with cyber security with a focus on
information processed.
With computing systems the kernel of security concerns is
the information handled by the system. The three general areas
to be secured are
(1) The ‘‘privacy’’ and conﬁdentiality of the information
(2) The integrity and authenticity of the information and
(3) The availability of the information for its use and
services.
Further, the legal and social concepts of a citizen’s ‘‘right to
privacy’’ are entangled with the challenge of cyber security and
the beneﬁts of the Smart City. That legal/social concept of pri-
vacy addresses conﬁdential aspects of life, control of one’s own
public proﬁle and a life free of unwarranted interference. This
applies to both state action and that of private parties.
Within most democratic and hybrid legal regimes under
common law, civil law and mixed systems there are core gen-
eral principles relating to privacy and cyber privacy:
(1) Activities within the home have the greatest level of pro-
tection and are generally protected from intrusion by
others absent reasonable grounds and, often, judicial
orders of intrusion, based on law.
(2) Activities that extend outside the home may still be pro-
tected as to privacy but the level of protection may vary.
This may depend on whether there is a ‘‘reasonable
expectation of privacy,’’ [4] under U.S. constitutional
law, or a special protection out by statute for that activ-
ity [5].
(3) Activities out in public or involving third parties may
have little or no protection as to privacy absent special
protection out by statute for that activity [5].
(4) Activities subject to public regulation may carry lesser or
no privacy protections, particularly where data collec-
tion is part of regulation or a pre-condition to state per-
mission to use regulated services [6].
(5) Any activity data may be monitored, collected and used
with the consent of the data subject, absent statutory
prohibitions on use even with consent. Third parties
may condition use of their services or products on con-
sent to such data use, even where a data subject may
consent without actually reading the consent document
they execute.
As to ‘‘cyber privacy’’ the legal regime is further deﬁned by
related, analogous statues that may prohibit unauthorized ac-
cess to a computer, a network and related data, unauthorized
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unauthorized data processing and analytics of a data collection
[7].
Any of these may be authorized by statute, judicial order or
the consent of a data subject.
So the data processes of the Smart City may be completely
permissible under the law. But the beneﬁts of the Smart City,
such as locational services, may create unexpected risks.Representation and modeling
We can represent the whole domain as some Sets and relations
as follows:
The sets are mainly, the Persons (P), the Servers (S), and the
Things (T) which are elements of the Internet of Things. Essen-
tially, we have:
P ¼ fpi; p2; . . . ; pLg
S ¼ fs1; s2; . . . ; sMg
T ¼ ft1; t2; . . . ; tNg
where: M< L N since there are less servers than persons and
much less persons than thing in the emerging Internet of
Things.
The traditional Security and Privacy concerns are focused
on protecting the vertices of the following within graphs:
Gp ¼ fP;EPg; whereEP ¼ fðpi; pjÞg suchthat i; j ¼ 1; 2; . . . ;L
GS ¼ fS;ESg; whereES ¼ fðsi; sjÞg suchthat i; j ¼ 1; 2; . . . ;M
The within graph of Things as listed here is currently ig-
nored as it is not the focus of attacks
GS ¼ fT;ETg; whereET ¼ fðti; tjÞg suchthat i; j ¼ 1; 2; . . . ;N
The external relation graphs representing interactions such
as between persons-servers and person-things are represented
below:
GPS ¼fP;S;EPSg;whereEPS ¼fðpi;sjÞgsuchthati¼ 1;2 . . .L; ;j¼ 1;2; . . . ;M
GPT ¼fP;T;EPTg;whereEPT ¼fðsi;sjÞgsuchthati¼ 1;2 . . .L; ;j¼ 1;2; . . . ;N
GST ¼fS;T;ESTg;whereEST ¼fðti;tjÞgsuchthati¼ 1;2 . . .M; ;j¼ 1;2; . . . ;N
With the growing number of interconnected Things, GPT and
GST are becoming extremely important and almost intractable.
Our focus in the near future will be on protecting the varices of
these graphs to create secure and privately acceptable Smart
Cities.Results and discussion
Our ﬁrst discussion is the impact of these issues relating to
transportation. Intelligent transportation, public and private,
has access to a web of interconnected data including ﬁnancial,
GPS, vehicle state (within various parameters), weather and
trafﬁc updates.
Though legal and social expectations of privacy are less in
public, mobile and regulated environments, people still have
expectations as to rights of privacy and information security
in those environments. Those security and safety concerns
may be enhanced because of danger from misuse or accident,
misconduct of others.As in other areas of social instrumentation, the evolution of
the Smart City and computational transportation networks is
evolving and growing. We examine and discuss those compo-
nents within the IN3 and the Source-to-Use structures and
the issues of security and privacy each presents as to the system
of automobile transportation in the United States. Automo-
biles are data sources from a variety of subsystems within them
that produce different types of information. These data are
collected locally but may also be transmitted and collected in
central repositories where it ay analyzed and used for a variety
of purposes.
Instrumented transportation systems – sources of data and the
data types
Automobiles and their systems may be a major source of var-
ious kinds of data about a person’s activities. Within an auto-
mobile the various systems represent different data sources
with different data types.
In the United States mandatory computational instrumen-
tation of automobiles began in the mid-1990s with the require-
ment that new cars sold in the United States have On-Board
Diagnostic computers (OBD II) to monitor engine and system
activity. These data could be used to diagnose engine perfor-
mance issues and behavior.
Other types of system instrumentation came into wider use.
Event data recorders (EDR), sometimes referred to as ‘‘black
boxes,’’ are data recording devices that record and preserve
various information on automobile recorded activities includ-
ing OBD data. The National Highway Trafﬁc Safety Adminis-
tration of the United States (NHTSA) mandated the types of
data EDRs must collect including the format of the data and
its survivability [8].
Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) systems for location and
navigation and devices for hands-free use of cellular telephone
and messaging services have also become popular in vehicles.
Some of the sources and types of data these systems collect
and store on the local instrumentation are:
OBD/EDR (Event Data Recorders) – speed, acceleration,
braking, seatbelt usage, vehicle status, airbag deployment
Hands-free telephone and messaging – Telephone and con-
tact numbers, messages, texts
GPS navigation systems – trip data, home site, backtrack
data (‘‘breadcrumb’’)
Security and privacy issues
For such instruments the privacy concerns relate to the data
kept in them. Locational data can detail much about a per-
son’s life they do not wish revealed, as Justice Sotomayor dis-
cussed as to medical, political or social contexts. GPS systems
can track destination and origination points when used and
may even store the actual route taken. Access to contact lists
and messages tells much that may need to be kept private
for personal, professional or commercial reasons.
Locational data can be a key security concern. Many set the
GPS originating address from their homes. Access to these
data details that home location. If the automobile is away from
home, that home may be a better target for burglary. If the
Security in Smart Cities 495driver is avoiding a stalker, now the stalker knows where they
live.
The OBD II systems are open access without sufﬁcient
security. OBD II Bluetooth dongles may be surreptitiously in-
stalled, allowing external monitoring [9]. Vehicles with native
Bluetooth access may also be compromised.
The Event Data Recorders raise several issues [10]. Vehicle
manufacturers have used EDR data in their defense against
claims their vehicles were at fault in crashes [11,12]. Claims
of surreptitious data collection as an invasion of privacy have
been rejected. Id.
Legally these data are within the control of the vehicle own-
er who controls access to that data absent a judicial order to
produce it to third parties, including the government. Access-
ing these data without consent or a judicial order is unautho-
rized access to a computing device that carries both criminal
and civil penalties.
With these data from these sources, the next step is to col-
lect that data via systems that offer remote viewing and remote
analysis for many different purposes.
Internetworked transportation systems
Interconnection with other remote systems may enhance trans-
portation features, from voice, messaging and security to
enhanced maintenance and vehicle servicing. The two-way
communications of mobile data services and the ‘‘telematics’’
of automobile instrumentation can speed a driver through a
toll booth, alert to an accident, keep an eye on your teenager
out driving and reduce your insurance rates by showing good
driving habits. Some of those services and the data they collect
are:
 GM OnStar service – data alert service, navigation, track-
ing, Stolen Vehicle Slowdown, Remote Ignition Block
 Chevrolet Volt monitoring and Nissan Carwings monitor-
ing systems for the electric Leaf
 Supplemental OBD/EDR monitors for insurance, commer-
cial and young drivers – e.g., Travelers IntelliDrive, Pro-
gressive Snapshot – that track location, speed, braking
and other driving data.
 GPS monitors for commercial, public safety, young drivers
– time, location data.
 Toll and fee transponders – ID, time, location data which
may also be used for trafﬁc data studies, tracking
 Bluetooth system access
 proposed OBD III transponder-assisted on board diagnos-
tics for engine and emissions performance using roadside
readers, satellite or local stations [13].
60% of cars worldwide should have connected capabilities
by 2017, according to ABI Research [14].
General Motors controversially proposed to share its mon-
itoring data with GM related third parties to offer mainte-
nance and other services, including those who have not
signed up for or continued OnStar services [15]. The negative
response from the owners of GM vehicles, especially those that
had discontinued the OnStar services and did not otherwise
expect their driving data was being monitored, led GM to
withdraw that proposal.Toll transponder services offer the great convenience of let-
ting drivers on through tolling stations, speeding their journey.
But that transponder data is now also collected by trafﬁc
authorities for data studies on trafﬁc activities. As the tran-
sponders identify the driver/vehicle for payment purposes, they
provide time and location data points on drivers or vehicles of
which the drivers may not be aware. To prevent this the de-
vices must either be turned off or, as one suggestion, covered
in a Faraday cage Mylar bag until needed for toll payments.
The availability of BlueTooth access to automobile systems
brings the beneﬁts and risks generally associated with Blue-
Tooth. Inadequately secured ports may lead to system com-
promise, the danger of which depends on the automobile
systems accessed via the BlueTooth port.
SEMA notes these concerns regarding the proposed OBD-
III data collection, transmission and monitoring for analytics
and use [5]. OBD-III imposes sanctions based on ‘‘suspicion-
less mass surveillance’’ of private property
 Random, possibly frequent testing
 No advanced knowledge vehicle will be tested
 Results of testing not immediately available (unless road-
side pullover follows)
 No opportunity to confront or rebut
 Possible use of system for other purposes (Police pursuit/
immobilization, tracking, cite speeders).
Intelligent transportation systems
Analysis of transportation data may further enhance efﬁciency
and safety. Analytics against these data can support interven-
tions that improve engine efﬁciency and reduce emissions.
Trafﬁc patterns and system utilization may be better under-
stood for better roads planning, signal use and differential
road use taxes.
Examples of such systems, data collected and analytical
outcomes are:
 Analysis of telematics-based driving data – Progressive’s
Snapshot will analyze driving data (speed, braking, time
of day, etc. . .) to predict risk of accident and resulting cost
[5].
 Transponder trafﬁc data studies
 Autonomous automobiles – Google driverless car.
Data analytics are massively powerful tools for modeling,
visualizing and understanding human behavior. The impact
has yet to be fully understood.
Telematic driving data is used in the United States and the
United Kingdom take the collection of data as to a driver’s
speed, braking, acceleration, location and other factors and
analyze it against historical data and patterns to predict who
will have an accident.
They can predict the risk of accident and the potential cost
such that better driving habits may be advised or introduced or
differential rates may be applied to compensate for the
increased ﬁnancial risk.
In the United States early efforts to restrict data analytics
across government databases had limited impact [16]. The
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ing data processing against privacy rights.
The potential beneﬁts of intelligent analysis of the mass of
trafﬁc data are huge. Safer and more efﬁcient transport, driv-
erless systems for the young, the elder and disabled and fairer
distribution of costs for casualty.
A key issue will be privacy and a citizen’s relationship with
the state, as detailed by Justice Sotomayor, above. As central
as transport is to modern life, such analytics will turn every-
thing into a transparent world unlike anything in the modern
world. Protecting privacy will require a combination of legal
and technical security measures. Each alone will be
insufﬁcient.
But security and privacy are also vital to the personal safety
and security of people and their families. The security issues
with information in the Smart City extend to relations between
the people of the city and their own personal safety. General
crime theory is another way to consider these issues for the
Smart City. One criminological theory for examining meta-
security issues in the Smart City is Routine Activities Theory.
Routine activities theory in crime control can map to informa-
tion security and suggest vulnerabilities and solutions for
enhanced IT security.
Felson et al. argued that three elements promote a criminal
act: a motivated offender, a suitable target and the absence of a
capable guardian [17,18]. The conﬂuence of these elements in
everyday activities increases the likelihood of crime; the
absence of an element decreases it. This approach can be
mapped to information security to suggest alternative
approaches to information security.
Information security for the Smart City must examine the
suitable targets of compromise and the consequences of that
compromise. Those would be, most directly, information and
the systems controlled by information. The information may
relate to personal privacy or autonomy of individuals, or it
may ‘‘intellectual property’’ exploited by a compromise, such
as copyright, patent or trade secrets. The systems compro-
mised may solely process the information or use it for control
systems ranging from power grids to medical services.
Routine activities theory suggests, distributed security ser-
vices and responsibilities. It delineates that three elements pro-
mote a criminal act: a motivated offender, a suitable target and
the absence of a capable guardian. The conﬂuence of these ele-
ments in everyday activities increases the likelihood of crime;
the absence of an element decreases it.
The ‘‘motivated offender’’ class may be identiﬁed by moti-
vations that extend from proﬁt to sheer circumstance. Motiva-
tions may be singly or in multiples embrace temptation,
provocation, available time and boredom. The ‘‘suitable tar-
get’’ is that object of opportunity for the offender and the facts
for the calculus of success that an offender makes. Those facts
considered include the ease of access to the target, the proﬁt/
reward it offers, the ability to avoid detection or ‘‘ease of
escape,’’ portability of the target and ease with which it is
disposed of.
The presence of ‘‘capable guardians’’ refers to constant and
present individuals whose presence deters misconduct or
speeds recovery by repair or sanctions against offenders. Vital
to this concept is that guardians are more than legal authorities
such as police. It includes friends, good citizens, neighbors and
parents whose moral suasion alone may deter misconduct.
Such guardians may support the recovery from misconductand assist legal authorities in the prosecution of those commit-
ting misconduct.
In its turn, information security addresses three general do-
mains of prevention, detection and recovery from a security
compromise. This applies generally to information systems,
and particularly to computers, networks and the Internet.
[Stallings] These goals may be secured through security ser-
vices for data that assure conﬁdentiality, authentication and
integrity and access control and availability, like the ITU-T
X.800 Security Architecture for OSI.
Digital objects, security domains and services and Routine
Activities elements may be compared and mapped. For the
Smart City the technical target and the related consequence,
such as injury to property, personality, life or limb, must be
viewed jointly as that, in turn, maps to the nature of the moti-
vated offender and the potential guardians to block that
offender.
In the context of transportation system motivated offenders
may include juveniles, thieves, vandals and stalkers/domestic
abuse perpetrators. The motivations range from boredom to
malice to proﬁt to madness.
Instrumented transportation systems offer suitable targets
for an offender motivated stalking/domestic abuse.
First and foremost, the victim/target’s privacy is heavily
compromised in that access to vehicle systems provides the of-
fender with near complete information on where, when and for
how long the victim/target has visited a particular location. It
may provide additional information on whom the victim/
target called.
This privacy violation is a major security risk. Once the
motivated offender has a proﬁle and location on the victim/
target at all times he or she knows when that victim/target
would be most vulnerable to a physical attack.
Further, override of vehicle electronics themselves may of-
fer opportunities for harassment or injury by such a motivated
offender.
These systems and their use must consider what capable
guardian services can mitigate these risks. Technical hardening
of such systems is important, even as some early implementa-
tions do not seem to have anticipated these risks from even
such vulnerabilities as open BlueTooth access ports. System
implementation that both locks the data collected by these sys-
tems and notiﬁes a vehicle user that the information is being
transmitted/accessed are important security features. Capable
guardians may include those who do vehicle maintenance or
other instrumented data recipients who may alert the victim/
target to compromise in the system that may appear in their
data. And it must also include the user/target, who should
not be left ignorant of these issues but should be informed of
the vulnerabilities, risks and proper responses.Conclusions
Matching the daunting security vulnerabilities Smart City sys-
tems may present in the hands of unwitting users is the absence
of a clear theory of law and rights to deﬁne what can and
should be done with the power these systems represent.
Justice Sotomayor suggested in her concurring opinion in
the Jones GPS tracking case that a reevaluation of the concept
of privacy and third party data collection should be under-
taken in this new age of electronic data collection and analysis
Security in Smart Cities 497[19]. Her concern, as seen simply in GPS data collection and
analytics, was that:
The net result is that GPS monitoring––by making available
at a relatively low cost such a substantial quantum of inti-
mate information about any person whom the Govern-
ment, in its unfettered discretion, chooses to track––may
‘‘alter the relationship between citizen and government in
a way that is inimical to democratic society’’ [20].
The good and the bad of this altered relationship may be
seen in investigation of the 2013 Boston Marathon terrorist
bombing in United States. The quick and wide distribution
of information via social media and other multimedia systems
aided in public engagement and the swift identiﬁcation of the
suspects, an association with possible motives and the appre-
hension of one suspect [21,22]. But it also led to false leads
and injudicious actions by some wrongly accusing individuals
and groups of the crime [23]. Some have come to question
whether or not the untrained use of these interconnected,
instrumented and unmediated social relations may have risks
that outweigh the beneﬁts [24–26].
These concerns are present in the discussions over the prop-
er role of state security in legal monitoring and analysis of tele-
communications transactional data, such as that over the
proper role of the U.S. National Security Agency.
In sum, the beneﬁts do and will far outweigh the risks when
the rights and liberties in a democratic society are observed
and protected. The Smart City offers us much. But we must
not let it take that which makes us who we are. Difﬁcult and
concerted debate on these issues is needed.
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